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Abstract
We consider the academic performance of Italian university graduates and
their labour market position three years after graduation. Our data con-
firm the common finding that female students outperform male students in
academia but are overcome in the labour market. Assuming that academic
competition is fair and that individual talent is equally distributed by gender,
we suggest that the gender gap evident in degree scores is endogenously due
to the greater effort exerted by female students. We find that females face
a greater increase in labor market returns from signalling through academic
performance. This higher prize explains the greater effort exerted by females
and the higher probability of winning the academic competition.
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21 Introduction
By estimating the academic performance equation of 26006 Italian students
who graduated in 2001, and their occupational status and earnings three years
after graduation, we find that the educational and occupational performances
of male and female students do differ: girls outperform boys in academic
achievement, but male graduates outperform female graduates in labor mar-
ket outcomes. We know from pre-existing literature that on average female
students outperform male students in academic achievements in most OECD
countries (OECD, 2004), and that wages for women are lower after control-
ling for education levels and other factors (Blau & Kahn, 2003) even at the
beginning of their careers (Kunze, 2005). Even if female graduates earn less
than male graduates, our data show that they face a greater increase in the
labor market return from educational performance.
A higher return on education for females appears to be the norm in both
U. S. and European countries (Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995); Loury
(1997); Card (1999); Dougherty (2005); Trostel, Walker, and Woolley (2002);
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) among others) and it is consistent with
alternative explanations such as human capital and sorting1 models of educa-
tion.2 However, while most work on educational returns is concerned with the
premia for additional qualifications or for years of schooling, we consider de-
gree score for the educational performance3 as a proxy for the individual abil-
ity in order to minimize potential estimation bias attributable to unobserved
heterogeneity (See also Dougherty (2005) and Naylor, Smith, and McKnight
(2007)).
We provide additional empirical evidence for the Italian graduates and
we refer to the economics of tournaments to interpret the gender gap in aca-
demic achievements. In educational tournaments rewards depend on ordinal
comparisons of academic scores across all students. Becker and Rosen (1992)
emphasize the importance of a student’s position in the distribution of aca-
3demic attainment, and they demonstrate that competition among peers does
stimulate students’ learning effort provided they are appropriately rewarded
for achievement.
Using the terminology of O’Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984) and
Schotter and Weigelt (1992) tournaments may be either symmetric or asym-
metric. Symmetric tournaments occur when agents are homogeneous and are
treated equally by the rules of the competition. Asymmetric tournaments may
be uneven or unfair. A tournament is uneven when agents have different cost-
of-effort functions. A tournament is unfair when agents are identical but the
rules favor some of them and discriminate against the others.
In this paper we suggest that the educational tournament is uneven demon-
strated by the different values that male and female students assign to the
prizes received. In particular, the value of the tournament prize depends on
the effect of educational performance on the (marginal) expected return in the
labor market and we show that this effect it is greater for females than for
males. The equilibrium thus predicts that female students exert more effort
than male students in the educational tournament.
In Section 4 we attempt to confirm empirically the assumptions put for-
ward by the simple educational tournament model we consider in Section 2
(Section 3 describes our data). First, we show that, for the most part, the
difference in educational performance is explained by the diversity in unob-
served characteristics (including effort) between male and female students.
Second, we attempt to provide empirical evidence that the amount of effort
supplied is in fact the key determinant of the unobserved characteristics, able
to explain differences in educational performance. Third, we argue that fe-
male students dedicate themselves more seriously to study because they gain
a higher marginal return in the labor market from success in educational com-
petition.4 This finding may be consistent with both human capital and sorting
models of education. However, we last test successfully the hypothesis that
4by means of higher grades female students do signal their ability to potential
employers.
2 A simple tournament model for educational per-
formance
In tournaments the outcome depends on comparison of performance across
players. In our application, this means that students are ranked according to
their educational performances. In a general framework, in order to increase
their probability of winning the tournament, players have to exert effort which
negatively affects their utility. The equality of marginal benefit and marginal
cost determines the optimal level of effort for each player. Accordingly, in
an educational tournament, both male and female students maximize a utility
function whose arguments are the rewards they receive in response to academic
achievement and the disutility of effort.
Consider for the sake of illustration only two students: a female (F ) and a
male (M) student. The students compete against each other in an educational
tournament. The utility function of student i, i =M,F , is given by:
Ui = Kigi(e)− ci(ei) (1)
where Ki is the value attached by individual i to the (unique, for the sake of
simplicity) ”prize” received by the tournament ”winner”. ci(ei) is the cost of
effort ei for individual i. The probability of winning depends on the amount
of effort each individual exerts as well as on the amount of effort put in by the
other individual (i, j =M,F , i 6= j):
Prob{i win} = gi(e) = gi(ei, ej) (2)
where e = (eM , eF ) is the vector of the efforts offered by students.5 We assume
5that ∂gi∂ei > 0 and
∂gi
∂ej
< 0 and of course
∑
i gi(e) = 1. When both male and
female individuals have the same cost function (which here means that they
have the same academic ability) and assign the same value to the prize the
educational tournament is even:
cF = cM
KF = KM
When the students are treated equally by the rules, the educational tour-
nament is fair :
gF (.) = gM (.)
If the tournament is fair and even, the optimal individual strategy will be
symmetric and in the equilibrium two identical individuals will exert the same
level of effort (Becker and Rosen (1992), p. 112).
However, we assume that the value associated to the prize by the individu-
als depends on their expected (marginal) return in the labor market, and that
this return differs according to the gender.6 In particular we have in mind a
situation where:
Ui = Kig(e)− c(ei) (3)
with KF > KM . This simple setup illustrates a tournament which is actually
uneven through the prize received by the participants.7
Under standard regularity conditions, the Nash equilibrium, e∗ = (e∗F , e
∗
M ),
is such that:
KF > KM =⇒ e∗F > e∗M (4)
Hence, a higher prize implies a higher level of effort in the educational tour-
nament. The higher the effort, the higher the probability of winning the
competition for grades, if the competition is fair (see equation (2)).
We believe this simple model provides a possible rationale for reconcil-
6ing the evidence (to be presented in the following Sections) that on average
female students outperform male students in academic achievements while
women receive, conditional on observable variables, lower wages and face a
lower probability of being employed.
Two important assumptions of this work are that the educational tour-
naments are fair and that male and female students have the same academic
ability, i.e. talent. Both assumptions appear realistic. The latter is sup-
ported by two meta-analyses conducted by Hyde and Linn (1986) and Hyde,
Fennema, and Lamon (1990) who evaluate both verbal abilities and mathe-
matical problem solving. They conclude that there are no cognitive gender
differences in verbal ability, and that women simply tend to use a different
cognitive process in mathematical problem solving. Moreover, the review of
46 psychological meta-analyses (Hyde, 2005) show much evidence for gender
similarities: 78 percent of gender differences are small or close to zero. Thus
we can reasonably assume the gender similarities hypothesis, i. e. the equal
distribution of general talent between men and women as a group.
Educational tournaments could be unfair because of sex bias in educa-
tional assessment and gender stereotyping by examiners.8 While many stud-
ies found no evidence that systematic sex bias affects marking (Newstead
and Dennis (1990); Dennis and Newstead (1994); McNabb, Pal, and Sloane
(2002)), there is some evidence that male prejudice acts against female stu-
dents. For instance, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999) suggest that because
men are expected to outperform women in standardized tests, women expe-
rience a stereotype threat that interferes with test performance. Though, as
far as we know, there is little evidence supporting the hypothesis that the bias
systematically discriminates against female students, and therefore we assume
that educational tournaments are fair.
However, the key assumption of the model is that female graduates face a
greater increase in labour market returns from educational performance. We
7interpret this as coming from a stronger signalling value for females than males.
In Section 4, we present evidence to support this interpretation by empirically
testing the signalling role of educational performance in explaining the higher
return on education for females.
3 Data and summary statistics
Our data come from the Survey on Labor Market Transitions of University
Graduates carried out in 2004 by the Italian National Statistical Office. The
Survey is the result of interviewing Italians who graduated from university
in 2001 three years after graduation. The retrospective information gathered
allows us to analyze both academic performance (final degree grades) and ini-
tial entry into the labor market. The graduate population of 2001 consisted of
155.664 individuals (67.913 males and 87.751 females). The ISTAT survey was
based on a 28% sample of these students and was stratified on the basis of de-
gree course taken and by the sex of the individual student. The response rate
was about 67.6%, yielding a data-set containing information on 26.006 grad-
uates. The data contain information on educational curriculum, occupational
status and the student’s family background and personal characteristics.
In particular, the principal variables contained in the data set can be di-
vided into the following five main groups. (i) University Career and High
School Background : including, kind of high school attended, high school mark,
other education, university, subject, duration, degree score, accommodation,
work during university, post graduate studies; (ii) Work Experience: includ-
ing, previous experience, experience in actual work, type of work, net monthly
wage; (iii) Search for Work : including, kind of work desired, willingness to
work abroad, preference over working hours, minimum net monthly wage re-
quired; (iv) Family Information: including, parents’ work, parents’ education
level, brothers and/or sisters; (v) Personal Characteristics: including, date
of birth, sex, marital status, children, country of domicile, country of birth,
8residence.
[Tables 1, 2 and 3 here]
Table 1 shows average degree score by gender and field of study. On average
female students obtain higher grades in all the types of courses considered (the
only exception being Science). The average difference between the female and
male score amounts to more than 2 points and ranges from a minimum of 0.27
for Humanities to a maximum of 3.13 for Economics, Business and Statistics.9
The average grade difference between male and female students is statistically
significant for most of the subjects studied, as indicated by the test in the last
column of the table. Indeed Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution of
female educational performance even (first-order) stochastically dominates10
the empirical distribution for male students.11 Thus our data appear to reject
the observation by Hedges and Nowell (1995) that, while on average female
students perform better than males, the scores of the latter exhibit a larger
variance and tend to concentrate at the upper end of the distribution.
Table 2 reports average monthly earnings and employment probability
three years after graduation by gender and field of study. Monthly earnings
in 2004 are in euros and net of taxes and social security contributions. The
average earnings are 1128, 1226 and 1017 euros per month for the sample as
a whole, for the male and the female sub sample, respectively. The average
employment probability three years after graduation is 0.75 and 0.66 for male
and female candidates respectively.
Therefore, on average, male graduates earn about 20 percent more than
females and are more likely to have a job three years after graduation.
Table 3 reports the probability of being employed as entrepreneurs and
managers out of the total of graduates employed according to degree groups
and gender. The average probability of being employed in an apical job is
about 1.91 percent and 0.7 percent for male and female candidates respectively.
We also estimate gender-specific earnings equations by controlling for self-
9selection.12
We then make use of the standard Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) de-
composition which breaks down the overall mean gender wage gap as an ”ex-
plained” component (due to differences in the average observable variables)
and as an ”unexplained” component of the gender wage differential. The de-
composition of the gender gap in mean log-earnings13 (0.09) shows that we
can explain from 39 to 45 percent of the total, depending upon whether male
or female coefficients are used to evaluate gender differences in characteristics.
Overall, we find higher grades for women in almost all types of courses on
the one hand, and lower entry wages for women three years after graduation
on the other hand. Moreover, less than half of the average gender wage gap is
explained by observed individual characteristics.
We acknowledge that our sample is potentially biased. In fact, our data
provide information only on individuals who have obtained a university degree:
there is no information on any control group of individuals leaving university
before reaching degree level. Therefore, in interpreting the effects of a number
of the variables, we should recognize the issue of sample selection. Previous
empirical research shows, however, a higher drop out rate for male students
with respect to female students (Boero, Laureti, and Naylor (2005); Micali
(2000); Arulampalam, Naylor, and Smith (2004)).
Therefore, in case of selection bias, this should mainly act against female
students in educational performance achievements.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we investigate our data. First, we examine whether the dif-
ference in the educational performance between men and women survives the
inclusion of relevant control variables and the extent to which performance dif-
ferences by gender can be explained according to gender differences in observed
characteristics (Section 4.1). In particular, we attempt to provide empirical
10
evidence that the amount of effort supplied represents a large part of the un-
observed characteristics underlying the gender gap in academic achievement
(Section 4.2). Moreover, we show that the marginal effect of educational per-
formance on wages is higher for female graduates than for male graduates
(Section 4.3). We interpret this as evidence of a stronger signalling effect for
females than males, which possibly explains the higher value female students
assign to the educational tournament prize. Last, we compare an explanation
of gender difference in educational performance based on a signalling effect
with the alternative explanation based on human capital investment (Section
4.4).
4.1 Factors affecting the gender difference in educational per-
formance
To measure the impact of gender on educational attainment, we estimate
the educational performance equation for female and male graduates. The
estimation results are then used to investigate whether the gender effect in
terms of degree performance arises because of observed differences between
male and female characteristics or because of unobserved input.
Focusing on subsequent job market entry, two dimensions of academic
performance are taken into account: degree score and the speed at which
students complete their academic career. In order to take into account both
dimensions, we build up the following measure for educational performance:
edperf =
dscore
1 + 0.10× years (5)
where dscore is the degree mark plus the laude or highest honors when it oc-
curs. The degree scores in the publicly available data are provided in brackets
rather than as a continuous variables. They fall into four intervals (< 79, 80-
89, 90-94, 95-99) and for scores higher than 99 the effective value is disposable.
We treat the degree mark as continuous variable by using the midpoint of each
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range when the value is not available. The number of years in excess (years)
used to get the degree14 is eventually corrected for those having carried out
military service during their university years. Obviously, the degree scores
have been normalized to take into account the different marking scale for each
faculty.15
In the educational performance equation we consider as explanatory vari-
ables both those variables determined prior to the time students enter college
and those linked to the kind of degree obtained and determined during the time
students attend university. To the first set belong marks gained in the high
school graduation exam and dummy variables for the type of high school at-
tended (whether generalist or technical/professional). We include also family
background variables such as parental education and occupation, the presence
of siblings and the father’s activity status when the individual was 14. The sec-
ond set of variables includes a dummy variable indicating whether the student
moved to attend university, dummies for degree subject and the university
attended.
[Table 4 here]
Table 4 reports the main results separately for the 8686 female students
and 7768 male students.16
Last, we decompose the male-female differential in educational perfor-
mance by means of the the standard Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) decom-
position. We observe that although differences in attributes are important in
explaining gender differences in educational attainment, with about 44% of the
gender gap in attainment being due to differences between male and female
characteristics, differences in the unobserved characteristics do also matter.
Indeed, about 56% of the gender differences in educational attainment have
to do with differences in unobserved inputs.17
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4.2 Accounting for the unobserved characteristics which ex-
plain gender difference in educational performance
We claim that a large part of the (unexplained) difference in educational per-
formance between male and female students is given by the difference in the
amount of effort the latter choose to devote to their studies. We believe that
female students choose intentionally to outperform male students to signal
their ability to potential employers (we will take up this point again in Sec-
tion 4.4 to explain why this is rational for them). To test this hypothesis we
compare the educational performance of full-time and part-time students. The
latter are severely time constrained, and can exert only a limited control over
the amount of effort to devote to academic activity.
[Table 5 here]
Table 5 shows estimates of the educational performance for full-time and
part-time students. The equations are very similar in terms of magnitude,
sign and statistical significance of the estimated parameters. The only excep-
tion is represented by the female dummy (Female) which is not statistically
significant for students in full time employment.18 Hence, the evidence of fe-
male educational over-performance holds only for full time students and not
for students who are also working while they attend university.
This suggests that the gender difference is not relevant per se in explain-
ing the educational performance differential (as it should be if it were due to
different inherent abilities), and that is endogenously related to the labor mar-
ket status. Our explanation for this is twofold. First, part-time students find
more difficult to engage in signalling activities. Second, students in full-time
jobs may have less incentive to signal their ability to future employers because
possibly they have already started a career.19
13
4.3 Different values assigned to the prizes received in the ed-
ucational tournament
One could wonder why female students put more effort into educational per-
formance than male students, given that they will receive lower wages. We
find a rationale for this choice in the higher marginal return that female stu-
dents gain from their higher grades. Even if female graduates earn less than
male graduates, our data show that they face a greater increase in the labor
market return from educational performance.
To this end, the following earnings equation was estimated for full-time
workers:
ln(w) = α+ β1edperf + β
′
2E + β
′
3X + β
′
4Z + ²
where w is the monthly wage,20 edperf is educational performance, E is a
vector of educational dummy variables,X is a vector of personal characteristics
and Z is a vector of regional dummy variables.
Assuming that the self-employed have no need to signal innate ability to a
future employer, we estimate the earnings functions for the employees (male
and female samples) by controlling for self selection in the employment status
(employees versus self-employed).21 The sample selection model is estimated
by means of the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure. Such estimation takes
into account the possibility that individuals may select a particular employ-
ment status for themselves because they have a comparative advantage.
[Table 6 here]
Table 6 shows the estimation of the wage regression for employees. The
results of the first-stage probit model are presented in Table 8. In Table
6 the significance of lambda confirms the selectivity bias for both samples.
Table 7 shows that the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on educational
performance (edperf ) is always greater for the female sample and that the
difference in coefficients between females and males is statistically significant
14
for all specifications, as indicated by the test at the bottom of the table.
4.4 Human capital versus signalling hypothesis
A higher return on education for females is common in literature,22 and it
is consistent with alternative explanations such as human capital and sorting
models of education. Empirically, both theories predict the same patterns:
females have a greater incentive to exert effort in school because educational
performance is worth more (at the margin) in the labour market to females
than to males.
To see whether the sorting or the human capital theory supports the higher
return on education for females, we test the screening hypothesis. While
human capital theory holds that educational performance augments individual
productivity, the screening hypothesis attests that educational performance
only signals inherent productivity.
Following Brown and Sessions (1998) and Brown and Sessions (1999) we
test two versions of the screening hypothesis: the strong screening hypothesis
(SSH) and the weak screening hypothesis (WSH). The SSH states that school-
ing is merely a signal for employers of the productivity of an employee. The
WSH on the other hand states that the primary role of schooling is to signal,
but that schooling also has some inherent productivity.
We build on the educational screening theory starting with the assumption
that screening is more important in some sectors than in others. In particu-
lar, we assume that the self-employed constitute the unscreened control group
because they have no need to signal innate ability to a future employer, and
we compare the rates of return to education across this and the employee sub-
sample (the screened group). In this framework, the returns to education for
the self-employed are nothing but true returns to human capital.
The WSH implies a significant positive return on education for the self-
employed, but a significantly higher positive return for employees. The SSH,
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in contrast, implies an insignificant return on education for the self-employed,
but a significantly positive return for employees (Brown and Sessions (1998);
Brown and Sessions (1999)).
[Table 7 here]
Tables 6 and 7 show the estimation of the wage regression for employees
and the self-employed, respectively. While we observe a positive selection
bias for employees, the estimates do not suggest any significant selection bias
for the self-employed.23 The educational performance coefficient (edperf ) is
statistically significant only for employees (both the female and male sample).
Hence, our results support the SSH, i. e. that educational performance has an
insignificant return for the self-employed, but a significantly positive return
for employees.
This finding appears to support our statement that the unobserved input
that causes the gender gap is nothing but signalling effort.
[Table 8 here]
5 Conclusions
We consider the academic performance of Italian university students and their
labor market position three years after graduation. Our data confirm the
well-established stylized fact that female students outperform male students
in academia but are overcome in the labor market. By decomposing the gen-
der difference in educational performance between observed and unobserved
factors we also find that about 56 percent of it is due to unobserved inputs. As-
suming that academic competition is fair and that individual talent is equally
distributed by gender, we suggest that the gender gap evident in degree scores
is due to the greater individual effort endogenously exerted by female students.
To provide support to our thesis, we first show that the gender differ-
ence in educational performance actually vanishes when we consider the time-
constrained part-time students, which would not happen if it were based on
16
systematic gender differences in individual ability. Second, we test the hypoth-
esis that the labor market value of academic achievements is greater for female
students, and find that actually their wage incremental expected value related
to educational performance is higher. Last, we test the screening hypothesis
to see whether the higher return on education for females is supported by the
signaling or by the human capital theory. We find that the higher return on
education for females comes from its signaling value.
These findings suggest a reconciliation of the stylized fact concerning the
gender differential in educational performances and market earnings which
supports our main thesis and is based on simple results from the economics
of tournaments. Since the ”prizes” assigned in academic tournaments have
a larger (expected) signalling value for female students, those tournament
are in fact ”uneven” by gender even when ”fair” (according to tournament
terminology). Thus, female students should be expected to rationally exert
more effort than male students, and obviously this implies that indeed in the
equilibrium the latter have higher more academic achievements.
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Notes
1Following Weiss (1995) we use the term sorting to refer to both signalling
and screening of workers; both signalling and screening serve to sort workers
according to their unobserved abilities.
17
2As stressed by Naylor et al. (2007) the student who does better at uni-
versity could be thought of as having acquired more human capital through
more productive study. Alternatively, a higher grade score at university could
be interpreted as a signal of higher underlying ability.
3See Section 4.1
4Other researchers have argued that women receive higher grades than
men because they work harder at school (Wainer & Steinberg, 1992). In Italy
the data carried out by Eurostat and referred to the period from April 2002
to March 2003 shows that the average time spent in school and university
activities is the same for males and females (Hours 0:04), but the average time
spent on homework is higher for females (0:09) than for males (0:06). (Cfr.
Harmonised European Time Use Survey 2005-2007 by Statistics Finland and
Statistics Sweden. https://www.testh2.scb.se/tus/tus/)
5Equation (2) is a reduced form for the stochastic mechanism which assigns
the prize as a function of the individual efforts. For example, the effort ei may
affect the distribution Fi(Si; ei) of the academic achievements Si of individual
i while the prize is ex post assigned to the individual associated with the best
achievements.
6In the empirical analysis of Sections 3 and 4, we show that while women
earn less (after controlling for education and other factors) even at the be-
ginning of their career, female graduates face an higher marginal effect of
educational performance on their wages with respect to male graduates.
7This model is equivalent to a tournament where the value of the prize
is normalized to one for everybody but the cost function differs among indi-
viduals. The strategically equivalent utility function for individual i may be
written as: U˜i = g(e)− c(ei)Ki .
8Sex bias can occur when there are differences in the way male and female
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students respond to different types of assessment. Gender stereotyping can
occur when the score given by an examiner is affected by favouritism towards
students of one sex.
9The final degree score ranges from 66 to 110 (for some Universities the
maximum mark awarded is 100). According to each faculty internal ruling a
laude (distinction) may be assigned to candidates with a 110/110 mark for
recognition of the excellence of their thesis (in this analysis the 110 cum laude
was transformed to 113).
10First-order stochastic dominance is a possible ordering between two stochas-
tic distributions. Let F (x) andM(x) denote the cumulative distribution func-
tions of the educational performance x for female and male students, respec-
tively. F first-order stochastically dominates M if and only if for every possible
educational performance x, F (x) ≤M(x). This means that for every possible
value of x, the probability of getting a educational performance that high is
never better in M than in F.
11Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution functions of educational per-
formance for female and male students. We only present results for the whole
sample but we also find very similar results when we consider specific degree
subjects. The only exception is represented by Science where the two cumu-
lative distribution functions cross several times but are very close throughout
the entire range of educational performance.
12The results of these estimations are not reported but are available on
request from the authors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
the net monthly wage. We control for all the variables included in table 6.
13The gender wage gap is quite significant given the fact that we are con-
sidering a sort of first-job market entry.
14In the Italian education system, each faculty only sets a minimum num-
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ber of years in which to obtain a degree. As a consequence there is a high
dispersion in the age at which students graduate. The speed of completion of
the academic career is, therefore, together with the final mark, an important
component of educational performance.
15See footnote 9.
16From here on, we omit students who graduated in the field of medicine
from the empirical analysis as the career path for these students is very dif-
ferent from that of other students. After having obtained their degree in
medicine, in general the students carry out a specialist activity which lasts at
least three additional years.
17In a preliminary version of this paper, we estimated the educational per-
formance equations by means of separate ordered probit for female and male
graduates in line with the analysis of McNabb et al. (2002). The Jones and
Makepeace (1996) decomposition approach showed that about 36% of the
gender differences in educational performance is explained by the difference in
observed characteristics between male and female students, leaving about 64
percent due to unobserved inputs.
18As in the Italian university system course attendance is not compulsory
but discretionary, the student population may be disaggregated as follows:
studying-workers (they have a full time job while studying at university and
amount to 14 percent of the student population); working-students (they have
a part time job while studying at university and amount to 47 percent of
the student population); studying-students (they only study and do not work
before completing their degree and amount to 38 percent of the student pop-
ulation). This distribution is the same for both male and female students.
19 Alternative interpretations are of course possible. For example, female
students may surpass male students in educational performance because are
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characterized by a greater sense of duty or self-discipline (Duckworth & Selig-
man, 2006), significantly affecting the results only when there is enough time to
divide between study and leisure. We test these two alternative explanations
checking whether educational performance exhibits some gender bias when the
sample is restricted to full-time students that are self employed at the time
of the survey. Indeed, also in this case there should be a weak incentive to
engage in signalling (both for men and women), while it is at best unclear why
the female sense of duty should not be at work. The result confirms our guess:
the female dummy is not statistically significant.
20The monthly wages are in euros and net of taxes and social security con-
tributions.
21The choice of whether or not to be self-employed is clearly endogenous.
Some individuals will have unmeasured traits that make it more likely that
they will excel as entrepreneurs, while others have traits that will make them
better suited to dependent employment. As a consequence, the observed dif-
ferences in returns to education may not accurately reflect what would happen
if the same group of workers were simultaneously observed as self-employed or
employees.
22Previous findings reveal that a higher return on female education appears
to be the norm in both U. S. and European countries (Murnane et al. (1995);
Loury (1997); Card (1999)). Dougherty (2005) summarizes 27 U. S. studies
focusing on the returns on education with data on both sexes. Of the 27
studies, 18 report unambiguously higher coefficients for females. Six report
multiple estimates where the female coefficients are mostly higher. Two report
mixed results that are evenly balanced. Trostel et al. (2002) estimate the
returns on education in 28, mostly European, countries and found that the
female education coefficient was higher in 24. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
(2004) list 95 estimates of male and female education coefficients from 49
21
countries at different dates. Of these 63 are greater for females, three are
equal, and 23 are greater for males (Naylor et al., 2007).
23Rees and Shah (1986), Brown and Sessions (1999) and Johansson (2000),
among others, find the same result.
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Average grade by gender and field of study
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Table 1
Average grade by gender and field of study
Field of study Male students Female students T-statistic
Sciences 102.80 102.06 -1.60
Pharmacy 101.12 102.58 3.12
Natural sciences 104.29 105.66 3.73
Medicine 105.46 107.00 8.99
Engineering 100.95 103.39 6.95
Architecture 103.43 104.47 2.78
Agricultural studies 103.26 104.74 3.44
Economics, business and statistics 98.12 101.26 11.11
Political science and sociology 100.94 102.71 4.11
Law 96.16 98.99 7.64
Humanities 106.98 107.25 1.08
Foreign languages 105.12 105.60 0.96
Teachers college 105.96 106.29 0.78
Psychology 101.40 104.09 4.94
Health 107.57 107.96 1.21
Total 101.95 104.01 21.21
Table 1 reports average grade by gender and field of study. The university mark, in
the Italian System, ranges from 66 to 110, eventually plus laude, denoting
excellence. The last column reports the values of the T-statistic for the Null
Hypothesis that the difference between the average grades is zero.
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Table 2
Average earnings and employment probability by gender and field of study
Average monthly Average monthly
earning probability
Field of study Male Female Male Female
Sciences 1220.43 1003.87 0.71 0.68
Pharmacy 1292.83 1089.34 0.84 0.77
Natural sciences 1074.25 1034.81 0.74 0.62
Medicine 1336.08 1097.90 0.41 0.30
Engineering 1318.57 1200.84 0.90 0.85
Architecture 1140.36 918.41 0.88 0.82
Agricultural studies 1087.28 921.93 0.81 0.69
Economics, business and statistics 1251.43 1104.73 0.82 0.77
Political science and sociology 1235.09 1056.38 0.86 0.85
Law 1080.43 895.73 0.62 0.52
Humanities 961.86 901.19 0.70 0.71
Foreign languages 1117.55 973.30 0.79 0.78
Teachers college 1078.29 948.69 0.86 0.84
Psychology 997.19 896.19 0.81 0.74
Health 1206.88 973.42 0.90 0.89
Total 1225.88 1017.38 0.75 0.66
Table 3
Probability of being employed in entrepreneurial and managerial positions three
years after graduation by gender and field of study
Male students Female students
Sciences 0.93% 0.35%
Pharmacy 1.07% 0.39%
Natural sciences 1.01% 0.50%
Medicine 2.22% 1.11%
Engineering 2.23% 0.13%
Architecture 1.45% 0.52%
Agricultural studies 3.58% 1.43%
Economics, business and statistics 2.85% 0.54%
Political science and sociology 3.03% 0.92%
Law 1.33% 1.02%
Humanities 1.18% 1.37%
Foreign languages 0.30% 2.25%
Teachers college 1.07% 0.81%
Psychology 1.40% 0.23%
Health 1.67% 0.56%
Total 1.91% 0.70%
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Table 4
OLS estimation results of the educational performance equation for male and female
students
Variable Female Students Male Students
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio
Constant 69.695 41.979 68.208 37.062
High School Mark 0.638 33.837 0.674 33.401
Subject (omitted group = Health)
Sciences -25.228 -22.259 -22.284 -18.100
Pharmacy -17.860 -16.608 -17.568 -13.918
Natural sciences -15.189 -14.250 -14.605 -11.595
Engineering -23.293 -20.817 -25.607 -22.262
Architecture -23.138 -19.409 -19.977 -15.724
Agricultural studies -11.997 -9.872 -14.480 -11.050
Economics, Business and Statistics -23.989 -23.758 -24.366 -21.190
Political Science and Sociology -16.919 -16.391 -17.511 -14.493
Law -26.581 -26.085 -26.260 -21.984
Humanities -17.366 -17.073 -15.287 -12.249
Foreign languages -20.712 -19.648 -15.225 -7.443
Teachers college -11.951 -11.360 -11.182 -5.852
Psychology -12.913 -11.416 -14.703 -10.320
School type (omitted group = professional school)
Liceo 5.599 7.818 5.213 5.984
Arts -0.755 -0.695 -1.493 -0.964
Magistrale 0.778 0.992 1.815 1.063
Technical institute 2.218 3.019 2.426 2.800
Father’s degree
University 0.533 1.105 -0.005 -0.009
High School 0.600 1.742 -0.348 -0.916
Mother’s degree
University 2.338 4.022 2.925 4.784
High School 1.187 3.396 1.023 2.686
Father Occupational status 1.061 1.752 -0.583 -0.874
Father’s occupation
Manager -0.196 -0.401 -0.016 -0.031
Executive cadre -0.214 -0.436 0.664 1.325
White collar -0.600 -1.639 0.107 0.273
Mother’s occupation
Manager 1.575 1.120 0.928 0.586
Executive cadre 0.240 0.418 -1.221 -2.008
White collar 0.877 2.314 -1.162 -2.826
Not born in Italy 0.008 0.004 -8.587 -3.240
Previously attended a different degree course 0.095 0.231 0.096 0.225
Studied in the same town of residence 0.639 2.256 0.761 2.489
Moved to a different town to attend university -1.378 -3.996 -0.794 -2.139
Frequency of private courses during university -4.472 -5.939 -3.954 -4.755
Siblings -0.913 -2.648 -0.337 -0.900
Course attendance 5.294 17.673 5.746 18.418
Possession of other degree 2.586 4.284 5.461 7.953
College dummies X X
Number of observations 8686 7768
Rbar-squared 0.35 0.34
F 51.005 (0.00) 42.615 (0.00)
P-values are represented in parenthesis.
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Table 5
OLS estimation results of the educational performance equation: full-time and
part-time students
Working during University Not working during University
Variable Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio
Constant 79.491 32.205 61.198 19.242
High School Mark 0.429 13.386 0.752 30.209
Female 0.513 1.028 1.159 3.168
Subject (omitted group = Health)
Sciences -28.332 -18.480 -20.735 -7.940
Pharmacy -23.058 -13.673 -15.463 -5.963
Natural sciences -18.727 -11.713 -13.432 -5.173
Engineering -25.336 -19.126 -23.678 -9.205
Architecture -22.895 -13.103 -19.727 -7.395
Agricultural studies -17.702 -8.348 -11.567 -4.299
Economics, Business and Statistics -26.475 -22.224 -21.253 -8.304
Political Science and Sociology -18.492 -15.715 -15.836 -5.989
Law -27.688 -22.131 -24.741 -9.663
Humanities -17.717 -14.683 -15.760 -6.066
Foreign languages -23.193 -15.537 -18.518 -6.845
Teachers college -16.563 -13.066 -9.524 -3.422
Psychology -17.062 -10.829 -10.822 -4.019
School type (omitted group = professional school)
Liceo 4.624 4.028 5.323 4.592
Arts -4.044 -1.869 -0.818 -0.430
Magistrale 1.790 1.446 -1.317 -0.942
Technical institute 2.096 1.838 2.032 1.727
Father’s degree
University -0.605 -0.677 0.924 1.491
High School -0.242 -0.401 1.224 2.603
Mother’s degree
University 2.657 2.413 2.537 3.602
High School 0.813 1.291 1.094 2.341
Father Occupational status 0.139 0.138 0.892 1.035
Father’s occupation
Manager 0.188 0.208 -0.325 -0.544
Executive cadre -0.139 -0.156 -0.099 -0.169
White collar 0.615 0.959 -0.951 -1.989
Mother’s occupation
Manager 6.064 2.063 -1.455 -0.857
Executive cadre -0.144 -0.131 -0.832 -1.239
White collar 0.065 0.092 -0.965 -2.011
Previously attended a different degree course 0.335 0.599 0.021 0.035
Studied in the same town of residence 0.088 0.178 1.389 3.730
Moved to a different town to attend university -0.817 -1.338 -1.963 -4.363
Frequency of private courses during university -3.434 -2.860 -2.834 -2.735
Course attendance 5.227 10.638 5.123 11.823
Possession of other degree 4.289 6.431 3.488 3.094
Siblings -0.040 -0.063 0.133 0.305
Not born in Italy 1.487 0.366 -4.245 -1.150
College dummies X X
Number of observations 2814 5197
Rbar-squared 0.47 0.34
F 27.147 (0.00) 29.177 (0.00)
P-values are represented in parenthesis.
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